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Gcedzarh UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 15 Cr. 867 (RMB) V. 5 REZA ZARRAB, Defendant. 6 -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. December 14, 2016 9 9:39 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. RICHARD M. BERMAN, 12 District Judge 13 **APPEARANCES** 14 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 15 BY: MICHAEL LOCKARD SID KAMARAJU 16 DAVID W. DENTON, JR. 17 DEAN SOVOLOS Assistant United States Attorneys 18 BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorneys for Defendant 19 BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN 20 JOSHUA KIRSHNER 21 KIRKLAND & ELLIS Attorneys for Defendant 22 BY: VIET D. DINH 23 BANCROFT PLLC Attorneys for Defendant 24 BY: EDMUND G. LACOUR, JR. 25

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1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED
2	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
3	Attorneys for Defendant BY: CHRISTINE CHUNG
5	FERRARI & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorneys for Defendant
6	BY: ERICH FERRARI
7	HARRY RIMM CJA counsel for the Defendant
8	- also present -
9	Special Agent Jennifer McReynolds, FBI
10	Asiye Kay, Turkish Language Interpreter
11	George Esayan, Turkish Language Interpreter
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THE COURT: So this is a continuation of the <u>Curcio</u> hearing which we started I believe it was on or about

November 30. Let me just see if I understand where things are and talk about the possible agenda for today.

First, let me just ask Mr. Zarrab if he is able to understand these proceedings with the help of the Turkish language interpreter?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So a couple of items of business. We have applications from two of Mr. Zarrab's New York counsel to step out of the case, and I just want to hear briefly about that.

Ms. Chung, among you, and also --

MS. CHUNG: Your Honor, Mr. Kleinfeld isn't here today.

THE COURT: Mr. Kleinfeld is not here today.

MS. CHUNG: He has never attended any court conferences, but I am prepared to speak on our application.

THE COURT: So, yes, would you just explain what's going on from your perspective, and in particular I would like you to address the issue about whether anything as a result of your representation that is impacted by this <u>Curcio</u> hearing or impacts the <u>Curcio</u> hearing, any conflicts from your firm or yourself that we ought to know about.

MS. CHUNG: No, your Honor. There is no conflict issue with either of the firms that are seeking to withdraw.

It's been a decision by Mr. Zarrab in preparing for trial and for deciding on the composition of his trial team that he will no longer retain the Quinn Emanuel or Clifford Chance firms, and for that reason we have made our application to withdraw.

And the <u>Curcio</u> -- maybe the connection is that as your Honor is considering retention issues and counsel issues, we wanted your Honor to be aware of what Mr. Zarrab's plans were.

THE COURT: What Mr.?

MS. CHUNG: Zarrab's plans were, obviously subject to the approval of the Court, but we thought it important to let the Court know what Mr. Zarrab's intentions would be, subject to the Court's approval.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Zarrab, is that right, that you wish Mr. Kleinfeld's firm and Ms. Chung's firm to step out of the case at this point?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. And at the same time, though, we have new counsel, Mr. Ferrari, I believe, who has filed a pro hac motion to be admitted.

Mr. Ferrari, tell us a little bit about yourself. You have a distinguished background and you work mostly I think from out of Washington; is that correct?

MR. FERRARI: That's correct, your Honor. And as

Ms. Chung alluded to, as part of the streamlining for the

trial, I have handled a number of IEEPA-related prosecutions on

the defense side, and I would be assisting the defense team as we move towards trial.

THE COURT: I guess streamlining means two leave, one comes in, so net one leave. Is that the streamlining that we are talking about?

MR. FERRARI: I believe so, your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: You are very welcome --

MR. FERRARI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- to be here.

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So let's also just talk for a moment about the -Mr. Dinh, probably this is your issue, or the waivers that I
had requested from the various banks, could you just bring us
up to speed as to how many banks? Is it eight, or whatever the
number is, that your firm represents who are also alleged to be
participant banks in the transactions involved in this case?

MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor. It is a total of eight. Your Honor is correct in that regard.

And with respect to the progress of those eight, six we have obtained waivers for. One, Citibank, has indicated they will not sign a consent of waiver, and we are still working with the eighth bank, Wells Fargo.

After the Court's order last Friday, we sought from the three banks that have not addressed their letter directly to the Court, we gave the Court's instruction and requested that they further advise the Court that it may rely on the

waiver and representations therein. We have heard back, as you saw, overnight, we filed this morning, from one of those banks, Standard Chartered. The other two banks, JPMorgan Chase and UBS, are still considering the request. They have acknowledged our request and very respectfully acknowledge the Court's request. It is just that this is not a standard matter for them in terms of doing something of that type of representation so they are working through their processes.

THE COURT: OK. I appreciate that. And I did see and review all of those waivers.

And I'll turn in a moment to Mr. Gillers' opinion, which has been forwarded to me. Among other things, he is of the opinion that the waivers are not even necessary from the banks' point of view. If I understand his argument correctly, it's that the banks presumably are not disadvantaged by the representation of them and Mr. Zarrab, it's Mr. Zarrab who is potentially disadvantaged, and so the waiver more properly comes from him.

MR. DINH: That is exactly right, your Honor.

And I point your Honor's attention to the middle of page 3 of Professor Giller's opinion where he says that the -- while I appreciate the Court's care in seeking consent from the banks, there is nothing for which Kirkland requires their consent. They are waiving no duties Kirkland owes them.

I think your Honor has correctly stated that the focus

of the <u>Curcio</u> proceeding before your Honor is to apprise

Mr. Zarrab of the limitations on our ability to represent

Mr. Zarrab given our obligations not to be adverse to the bank.

And I think the <u>Curcio</u> questions that the government has presented, we have agreed to and we have added to, at the recommendation of Professor Gillers, correctly states those points.

May I add, your Honor, that the only really contrary authority that the government has cited with respect to the professional obligation occurred in Footnote 1 of the original Curcio letter that the government submitted on November 18th, and that Footnote 1 states that New York Disciplinary Rule 5-105 requires that all clients that are subject to conflicts waive the conflict in writing. I would like to advise the Court that that rule has been superseded in New York by Rule 1.7 since April 1, 2009, and so, therefore, Professor Gillers' analysis of the relevant law, the Rule 1.7, is the controlling analysis.

THE COURT: Great. I appreciate the point, and I just make one observation. So sometimes judges and lawyers and even law professors have somewhat different fish to fry, as they say. So I am eager to follow up, maybe it is belt and suspenders, but to make sure we have those waivers on behalf of the banks as well.

MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor. We will submit any

communications to the bank as we are able to obtain.

But I think the issues, all the issues are fully joined before the Court because Citibank has indicated to us that it will not consent to waive, so I do not think that they will reconsider their position in that regard.

THE COURT: OK. So then let's turn to Mr. Gillers' -Professor Gillers, oh, by the way, who is regarded as clearly
expert in these matters, so you couldn't have a better person
to write an opinion. There is nevertheless one issue that I
would like to explore further. It relates to his opinion and
it also relates to the conflicts issue.

Oh, let me just ask for a moment. The government obviously saw Mr. Gillers and read Mr. Gillers' opinion, right?

MR. LOCKARD: We did. We received it last night when it was filed on ECF.

THE COURT: Right. And have you formed an opinion about that opinion, so to speak? Do you agree with it, or do you have questions related to it, or are you seeking your own counsel with respect to these issues?

MR. LOCKARD: So we are not currently seeking outside opinions about this issue. I think we do have certainly some thoughts about --

THE COURT: Hold on a second. If you could use the podium, Mr. Lockard.

MR. LOCKARD: I think we do have certainly some

thoughts about even on the quick review we have been able to accomplish since the opinion was filed last night. And I am happy to sort of speak to all of the issues that the government has been considering in connection with these <u>Curcio</u> proceedings, or if the Court would rather sort of take them issue --

THE COURT: I will come back to that.

I just wondered if you were in a hundred percent agreement with it, it would be one thing, but if you are less than that, I think we'll come back to other issues.

MR. LOCKARD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: How would you characterize where you are?

MR. LOCKARD: I think, significantly, there are two issues that I think the government disagrees with respect to Mr. Gillers' opinion, or at least the characterization of that opinion. The first is, you know, again, the government does believe that in the context of this prosecution there is adversity between Mr. Zarrab and between the victim banks.

THE COURT: OK. That is one. We'll come back to that. Was there another one?

MR. LOCKARD: We do believe that under -- you know, granted, the New York rules have shifted from the previous version to the current rules, but the current rules still do require, under Rule 1.7(b)(4), that each affected client give informed consent, confirmed in writing.

THE COURT: OK. So you support the waiver process, as it were?

MR. LOCKARD: It appears to be required by the rule.

THE COURT: OK. All right. We'll come back and hear from you and from Mr. Dinh in a minute. But here's the one issue -- thank you. Oh, and we have Mr. Rimm.

Again, I should mention, Mr. Rimm, you were appointed by me as outside independent counsel for purposes of this Curcio proceeding of Mr. Zarrab, and I think you indicated to me in a letter recently that you have had I believe an updated meeting with Mr. Zarrab with respect to the issues here?

MR. RIMM: Mr. Zarrab and I met yesterday morning.

The focus of yesterday's meeting was on the six additional banks, and my letter from yesterday early afternoon addresses each of those six banks.

I should just note for the record that I spent some time with Mr. Zarrab this morning discussing with him the three additional filings, of which I am aware, that were filed after my meeting with him from yesterday morning. That would be, number one, the Kirkland and Ellis letter from yesterday attached to which was the Gillers opinion. Mr. Zarrab and I focused on the two additional questions that were proposed to be included in the <u>Curcio</u> colloquy.

THE COURT: Proposed by Professor Gillers?

MR. RIMM: Right.

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We also discussed the December 13th letter from Kirkland & Ellis updating the Court as to the status with respect to the Court's request for the letters to be either readdressed or for supplemental letters to be submitted. And we also spoke about Kirkland & Ellis' December 14th letter from this morning attached to which was a supplemental submission from Standard Chartered Bank.

THE COURT: OK. So here's the issue that I want to delve into in a little bit more detail, and it may turn out that it is a nonissue in relation to this Curcio and it is just a question of my own interest and fascination or maybe there is some more to it than that. So that has to do with the bank, the HSBC Bank situation, and here is the following. So at the current moment both you and Mr. Clement and one of your other partners, all of whom have argued in this court on behalf of Mr. Zarrab -- Right? -- are actually at the very moment arquing what turns out to be a very similar sanctions case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on behalf of HSBC. So the issues have been narrowed substantially in terms of the appeal and what is being argued. But that underlying case, interesting, stems from an information that was a criminal information that was filed in the Eastern District of New York in 2012 by the government against HSBC Bank U.S., U.S.A. and And, in fact, I must say I was intrigued and I don't Holdings. know what the implications there are necessarily for us here,

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but when I say it is a similar sanctions case, HSBC Bank was actually accused by the government of, just for a summary, of not having the structures in place as a bank — the safeguards, the methods, the process, the oversight — and even more than that, actually, they were accused of willfully violating, among other things, the very same sanctions law that Mr. Zarrab is accused of violating in this case going back to 2012.

So the questions that I have -- and, again, maybe they are just questions that are just because it is so interesting, but -- well, let me just, before I get to that: So what happened in that case is that there was no prosecution ultimately in the sense that the government agreed to enter into what's called a deferred prosecution agreement with the banks in that case, but along with that the banks, if I remember correctly, forfeited over a billion dollars. That was Number two, they set up a five-year monitorship, number one. or whatever, during which time they agreed -- and that period is ongoing, they are still in the monitorship. And the monitor is a respected attorney, Michael Cherkasky, who many of us are familiar with, and they agreed to implement a whole series of measures to make sure that those violations of the sanctions law could not, would not recur.

So this regime is a dramatic, for want of a better phrase, know-your-customer series of requirements and responsibilities, which the banks agreed to implement and,

hence, they got the deferred prosecution agreement.

So here's some of the questions that I have about that, and I don't know if it impacts this legally, the <u>Curcio</u>. It certainly does -- it certainly is interesting, or ironic, or whatever.

So probably the implications are that the wall -- the ethical wall that Kirkland was proposing, you all were proposing, between the lawyers who work on the bank cases and the lawyers who work on Mr. Zarrab's case doesn't exist with regard to HSBC because in fact there you are representing that very bank and Mr. Zarrab, now do and will.

So here are some of the questions I have. So this one is for the government or for you. So are some or more of the transactions that Mr. Zarrab is accused of entering into which the government says are illegal, did some or more of those involve HSBC? We know "yes" is the answer to that, but part B is did some of them involve HSBC even after this monitorship was set up and entered into? If the government knows?

MR. LOCKARD: It's hard to say for certain because the investigation relating to HSBC was conducted by a different U.S. Attorney's Office and a different investigating agency or agencies, but it does appear that that is certainly a possibility given the overlap in the timeframe of the monitorship and the timeframe of the charges in the Indictment and the fact that HSBC is such a major player in U.S. dollar

corresponding account business. There is certainly a likely possibility.

THE COURT: It struck me as that also, also as a possibility, as someone who is even further removed from the nitty-gritty details and facts of the case, just looking at the dates and looking at the players. So that's one question I had. All right. And if that would matter in any way.

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor -- excuse me, sir. Benjamin Brafman for Mr. Zarrab.

Just so it's clear, the defense maintains that if there were any such transactions by HSBC, they were with companies which, although charged in the Indictment, they maintain they are completely unrelated to Mr. Zarrab personally. So I don't know whether that alters the issue at all but that's --

THE COURT: So say that again. Explain that. There could be other defendants or --

MR. BRAFMAN: There are a number of entities charged in the Indictment which the government suggests are related to Reza Zarrab that we maintain or had maintained that he does not own or have any ownership interest in those companies. And I believe if there is a transaction involving HSBC and some of the companies charged in the Indictment, I just want the record to reflect that we maintain that Reza Zarrab is not the owner of those companies. I don't know if that alters your Honor's

inquiry but I just want to make certain --

THE COURT: No, that is very helpful.

MR. BRAFMAN: That we are not conceding anything.

THE COURT: No. I get that. Thanks.

So one obvious question is does the fleshing out of this -- well, did you feel or do you feel that there was any need or did you talk to Mr. Cherkasky or anybody about that, the monitorship, in connection -- only as it relates to this Curcio proceeding?

MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor, thank you very much for that inquiry because it is one that we take very seriously.

Your Honor is entirely correct in your recitation of the case in the Eastern District. I would only start by providing the context that we, the Kirkland & Ellis lawyers, were not representing HSBC with respect to the underlying information, with respect to the deferred prosecution agreement, or even with respect to the interactions with the monitor as part of that compliance. We were retained for the limited purpose of reviewing and then ultimately prosecuting an appeal, alongside with the government, of a District Court order unsealing and making public Mr. Cherkasky's report to the government. So it was that narrow of a representation, not what is underlying the entire matter.

THE COURT: Got you. So, this question: Is that the what the Gillers' opinion -- well, I don't know what he knows

or looked into or if he was aware of the monitorship and all of that, but is the thrust of his opinion that let's assume those facts are the facts that for purposes of a <u>Curcio</u> proceeding you can separate the issues out so that if the appeal issues — and this appeal relates to the publication of some documents, or not — if that's unrelated to the Information, etc., then that means that there is no conflict? Can lawyers splice or dice the issues of one case, one transaction, and notwithstanding the underlying case, here the information charging the bank, but say it's OK to represent somebody for the narrow issue on appeal as long as that issue is — well, I don't know about "as long as" — even though there is a set of facts underlying that case that might pose some question?

MR. DINH: Yes, I think your Honor posed exactly the question that we were concerned with and asked Professor Gillers to focus on specifically. He addressed that at page 4, specifically Footnote 3 of the Information, that we had wholly apprised him of. And the basic inquiry is fairly straightforward, as one should divide the duty to the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality. We owe both to both clients, HSBC, as well as to Mr. Zarrab.

With respect to the duty of loyalty, there is no direct adversity because we do not represent HSBC in this proceeding. It is a separate proceeding. And we owe HSBC that duty of loyalty notwithstanding our representation of

Mr. Zarrab in this case.

ensures that the defendant is fully apprised of the limitation on our ability to represent him fully because of our preexisting obligation to HSBC. And so that's why under Professor Gillers learned opinion and our position, our representation of Mr. Zarrab is of limited scope; that is, everything except that is dealing with the bank and may be potentially adverse to the bank. And that's why the questions in the <u>Curcio</u> proceeding, after it was done and originally proposed and as we originally acceded to, ask Mr. Zarrab whether he understands that and whether he knowingly and intelligently waived that right of Kirkland to represent him entirely, not just for the limited purpose of the issue of not dealing with the case.

THE COURT: I get it.

MR. DINH: With respect to the duty of confidentiality, as your Honor indicated, our prophylaxis, the wall, does not work as a prophylaxis because Mr. Clement, myself and another lawyer are on both sides of the wall. It is conceivable that some information from Mr. Zarrab's case may be relevant to the HSBC case, and it is conceivable, and although these are all within the realm of conceivability rather than a possibility, but highly conceivable that some information on the HSBC case may be relevant to Mr. Zarrab's case. We owe

that duty of confidentiality both under Rule 1.6(b) and 1.8(b), independent of any wall that we would have dealt with and worked through as a prophylaxis. That is why we have advised Mr. Zarrab that we will not use any information that HSBC may have in aid of — or what we may learn in the course of representing HSBC in aid of his representation, and, indeed, we can't because we are limited in our representation of Mr. Zarrab. So, therefore, there is no adversity in that regard.

Likewise, our agreement with HSBC fully ensures that we protect any information that conceivably could be used here in order to represent Mr. Zarrab. Again, it is a mere impossibility because we have limited the scope of our representation of Mr. Zarrab to those issues not dealing with the banks, and so therefore we have eliminated the possibility that such information would be used and our confidentiality would be violated.

We have further established procedures that is in the now nearly impossible and highly unlikely, I would say well not impossible but conceivably, that a Kirkland and Ellis pleading would mention HSBC, consistent with our duties to Mr. Zarrab, we would give HSBC an opportunity to review that so that they could make their own judgment that there is no confidential information that has been improperly used. So I think that we have established procedures both structural, by limiting the

scope of our representation of Mr. Zarrab, and also procedural in order to ensure that there is no breaching of the duty of confidentiality, either way.

Your Honor mentioned the question of adversity as well as the viability of waiver with respect to the banks. The key part here that — I think the key part of the analysis that Professor Gillers presents, as well as in our opposition, is that there is no adversity because we do not represent HSBC in this proceeding, and so — and we have indeed walled off, limited, if you will, our representation of Mr. Zarrab so that we would not be taking a position adverse to the banks.

Indeed, we would not be dealing with any of the — effectively, we would not be dealing with any of the bank propositions because the banks potentially are affected by that case. And so in that sense we are not adverse and cannot be adverse.

So the only question is the <u>Curcio</u> proceeding for Mr. Zarrab, whether he understands the limitation on Kirkland & Ellis' ability to represent him fully, and then whether or not that limitation is reasonable to give him an effective defense. With respect to the first, the <u>Curcio</u> questions aptly addresses. And with respect to the second, the fact that we have able counsel representing Mr. Zarrab in all aspects of the proceeding more than amply provides the Court with the comfort that he would be adequately represented notwithstanding the limitation on Kirkland & Ellis' ability to fully represent him.

And so, therefore — and this is where the difference between the former rule, 505-105, and Rule 1.7(b)(4) is relevant, because the prior rule requires written consent by both clients when there is a concurrent representation. The new rule, the formulation is "affected" clients. So the insertion of the word "affected," I submit, permits and validates and codifies the position that we and Professor Gillers have articulated here, which is the banks are not affected because of the sufficient, adequate and complete limitation on our ability to represent Mr. Zarrab to the extent that it potentially affects the banks' interests.

THE COURT: So here is a hypothetical question. Is the analysis different if, for example, the appeal that you are arguing, or will be arguing, in the Second Circuit went to the merits of the deferred prosecution arrangement, as opposed to this issue of whether a particular document ought to be public or not?

MR. DINH: No, your Honor, it would not be, simply because, again, our representation of Mr. Zarrab will be limited to matters other than the bank fraud issues, and so, therefore, there is no adversity --

THE COURT: Say that again. Your representation of Mr. Zarrab would be --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ DINH: Limited to issues other than the bank fraud charges.

THE COURT: Which bank fraud charges? In this case? 1 2 MR. DINH: In this case, your Honor, yes. 3 THE COURT: Didn't Mr. Clement already arque the bank 4 fraud charges in this case on the motion to dismiss? 5 MR. DINH: He did, your Honor, at a time when the 6 potential conflict was not identified because HSBC was not 7 named in this case, and we were notified that there would be a potential conflict in that regard. And so as soon as we 8 9 learned of the conflict and as part of the <u>Curcio</u> proceeding 10 here, we advised Mr. Zarrab of the potential issues and advised 11 him that he has the right not to consent as part of the Curcio 12 processes. 13 THE COURT: OK. 14 THE CLERK: Mr. Lockard, if you could use the podium, 15 please. MR. LOCKARD: Your Honor, I think the HSBC issue 16 17 highlights how fully and complex of an issue is presented with 18 respect to the <u>Curcio</u> issues in this particular case. 19 Just to take a step back, as a background principle, 20 the Court has a couple of obligations and a couple of responsibilities here. The first is to ensure --21 22 THE COURT: Wait. Before you leave -- so I don't mean 23 to cut you off, but are you heading in the direction of 24 contending that Kirkland & Ellis cannot participate in this

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case?

MR. LOCKARD: What we're contending for now --

THE COURT: Or is it so leaning?

MR. LOCKARD: No, we are not taking that position at this point. We are taking the position that in order for the Court to effectively exercise the broad discretion that it does have in addressing and resolving issues presented by conflicts of interest, that judgment has to be informed judgment. So the facts matter, and it's important to the government to ensure that the Court has as robust of a factual record in front of it in order to be able to exercise its discretion appropriately.

The factual issues relating to the HSBC issue we think are particularly thorny. I disagree with Mr. Dinh when he says that there is not adversity here between Mr. Zarrab and the banks, as the government has repeatedly said. The government contends that the banks are victims of a bank fraud. So while the banks are not technically parties, because they can't be in a criminal prosecution, they are nonetheless involved in this matter as witnesses and as victims. If they are victims, they have certain rights under the Criminal Code, including rights to notice, rights to participate in certain aspects of the proceedings, and potentially rights to restitution for any losses that they may have suffered.

The defendant in this case has already taken the position that the banks are not victims, which is a position that is adverse to the banks' rights as victims. So we think

there already has been adversity between Mr. Zarrab and the banks in this matter.

When it comes to the HSBC matter, we had an extensive discussion between the Court and the government and defense counsel about potential trial arguments or trial defenses relating to the banks. And Mr. Zarrab made it clear that one potential argument that he was not going to waive and that may very well come --

THE COURT: Not going to waive?

MR. LOCKARD: And could very well come up at the trial would be a contention with respect to either the bank fraud charge or the IEEPA charge or who knows which charge, that the banks either were indifferent to the conduct that he was engaging in and did not view the nexus to Iran as material or were somehow complicit, and that is an argument that he has maintained in his quiver of available arguments.

The representation of HSBC undoubtedly puts the Kirkland firm in possession of material confidential information that relates to that issue. It is not a possibility, it is not a hypothetical, it is a certainty that Kirkland possesses confidential information about HSBC that is relevant to a potential defense that we've already discussed on the record at the prior conference.

So when Mr. Dinh proposes that the firm is not actually going to be adverse to HSBC, what we're pointing to

are a bunch of conditions that have been placed on HSBC's waiver of the conflict. And I take it that the idea is that these conditions effectively handcuff the firm from doing anything that could be adverse to HSBC's interests and, therefore, there is no longer any conflict with respect to HSBC. If that is in fact the contention that the Court is being asked to rely on, then we think it is important for the Court to be able to assess whether that contention is in fact true and to be able to assess whether those conditions create circumstances that might make it unreasonable for a defendant to agree to those conditions. That is the Court's function that it has to be able to exercise based on an appropriate factual record.

The conditions that have been placed on the HSBC waiver include a pretty unusual condition that could give HSBC advance access to pleadings in this case before they are filed, to review those pleadings before they are made to the Court or to the government. So what's being proposed is that the defendant is going to agree that the alleged victim of his crimes could have an opportunity to review the arguments his lawyers are going to make on his behalf before they're filed. We think that is a pretty complicated issue to address from a conflicts perspective and from a <u>Curcio</u> perspective.

It's also been proposed that the firm's role in this case is going to be so limited that it is no longer going to

deal with the banks. It's not clear exactly where that is memorialized or how that is formalized, but it is also not clear to the government at this point what the scope of that limitation is. Given the fact that the bank involvement is so central to the charges in this case, it's hard to see what is left if you take the banks out of it, because the banks are not just involved with respect to the bank fraud charges, they are also involved in the sanctions charges because the gravamen of the sanctions charge is bank transactions.

They are also involved in the money laundering charges, because the specified unlawful activities that are alleged to have been promoted are the IEEPA violations and the bank fraud violations. So if we are carving out anything having to do with the banks, it is not clear what exactly is left over.

And one final complication that we can see from Mr. Gillers' letter is he appears to propose an additional condition. It is not really explicit, but it appears that he is also suggesting sort of an ethical wall within Mr. Zarrab's defense team so that not only would Kirkland & Ellis attorneys not be able to take certain overtly adverse steps, such as cross-examining bank witnesses or advancing arguments about bank wrongdoing, but they would also not be able to participate in those discussions or decisions within the defense team. I think that is a new condition, sort of an internal defense team

wall, that has not previously been put before the Court, and I think that that is another issue that I think the Court has to be confident of in determining what are the factual parameters of the proposed waivers and in what ways could those impact the firm's ability to represent the defendant effectively and to what extent do they reflect valid waivers by the banks.

So as I said earlier, we have some additional thoughts sort of generally about this matter, but I think those are the issues that jump out at us particularly with respect to the HSBC representation.

THE COURT: As a practical matter, is one thing that you are suggesting that the <u>Curcio</u> questions be revised that are posed to Mr. Zarrab? Would that either illuminate and/or resolve any issues that remain?

MR. LOCKARD: There are a couple of ways that these issues play out in the decision that the Court ultimately is going to have to resolve here. One is that, you know, it is the government's view that the nature and scope of the banks' waivers are relevant information for both Mr. Zarrab to consider and for the Court to consider in determining whether Mr. Zarrab's waiver is a knowing and intelligent one. A voluntary waiver is no good if it is not also knowing and intelligent.

I think Mr. Zarrab and the Court also have to be confident in the validity of those banks' waivers or to the

extent to which they are subject to uncertainty or revocation later down the line, because if conflict issues are reraised later on in this proceeding it's going to affect the administration of the proceedings from the Court's perspective, it could potentially affect the defendant's trial rights depending on the timing and the nature of those things, so it is in everyone's interest to make sure that we have a lot of transparency here all around.

The second way that the bank waivers are relevant to what the Court has to decide is there is this concept in determining whether a conflict is waivable about whether the attorney, if permitted to stay on the in the representation, would be so diminished in their ability to zealously represent their client that it's not really a reasonable thing to waive. I think the Court has to be able to assess, given whatever conditions are being proposed on the representation, would it under those conditions be reasonable for the defendant to waive the conflict and would those conditions have a material impact on the firm's ability to represent the defendant. So those are the two ways that we think that this is relevant to the issue the Court is going to have to decide.

THE COURT: And how are those two issues fleshed out further? Is the record adequate? I am going to raise the question again of whether the <u>Curcio</u> questions need revision to illuminate either of these two issues?

MR. LOCKARD: I think the record probably needs more clarity on what really are the scope of the conditions that have been placed on the banks' waivers, what is the scope of the limitations that Mr. Gillers is proposing. You know, for example, one of the things Mr. Gillers says is that Kirkland would be prohibit from taking certain actions that could be harmful to the banks, and one of those says, for example, accusing the banks of wrongdoing. That is an example. What is the full scope of what it is that the firm is not going to be doing and not going to be participating in decisions about and not willing to be sharing information with the other firms and lawyers on the team? What really is the scope of the limitations that the Court is being asked to rely upon in order to determine that the waivers are effective and that Mr. Zarrab has knowingly waived his conflict.

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, can I be briefly heard?

THE COURT: Yes. I was just going to turn to you,

actually, and ask you, as a general matter, since you represent

Mr. Zarrab, you know -- this is too simplicit but what do you

think of all of this, so to speak, is really what I am asking?

MR. BRAFMAN: Judge, I am, you know, pleased that the Court has engaged in this discussion, and clearly the Court has spent a substantial amount of time and effort in trying to resolve this issue. And I also commend Mr. Dinh and his firm for trying their best to accommodate the Court's requests and

furnishing your Honor with as many waivers as is humanly possible.

At the end of the day, I think what the Court needs to I think recognize, hopefully, is that this boils down to a question of trust, because regardless of the questions you put to Mr. Zarrab and Mr. Dinh and myself, we in the well of this courtroom on both sides rely on each other's professionalism and integrity. We work with protective orders on both sides, and we assume the parties will act responsibly.

This case really has two parts. There was a motions part which has been resolved. After careful review, your Honor has issued its rulings, and right now we are abiding by those rulings in preparing for trial.

The issue with respect to the banks, to me, at least, is fairly simple. We want Mr. Dinh and his firm to remain in the case. I think they have demonstrated their scholarship over and over again in very, very complicated and novel issues dealing with IEEPA sanctions. But with respect to the trial itself, they were never contemplated as being part of the trial team that would cross-examine any witnesses but certainly will not be cross-examining bank witnesses. And we do not need their confidential information, should they have any, in order to prepare for the cross-examination of bank witnesses. Much of what is in the HSB case, for example, is a matter of public record. The briefs have been filed. The arguments will be a

part of the public record. And I would never ask or expect Mr. Dinh or his colleagues to divulge any confidential information, nor would we try to obtain it.

Whether the banks are victims or not in this case is a question of fact, not really something that we need to address any longer because your Honor has ruled on the bank fraud issue. We reserve the right after the trial is over in the charging conference to revisit those issues depending on the information that we obtain from bank witnesses. But it is either I or Mr. Kirshner or Mr. Ferrari, who has no conflict, who will be questioning bank witnesses.

So I think this is a very intelligent, smart, academic exercise that the Court must engage in. I think with the recommendation of Professor Gillers, we have independent counsel as well who has discussed these issues with Mr. Zarrab, as have I, and I think he is prepared to make an intelligent, knowing waiver of today and can respond to all of the Court's questions, and I think that should suffice, most respectfully.

THE COURT: Do we have to modify those questions at all further to reflect any of your concerns or comments or Professor Gillers', for that matter?

MR. DINH: Your Honor, we asked Professor Gillers to review the questions, and the relevant question is question number 10.

THE COURT: In your --

1 MR. DINH: In both the original and the revised. THE COURT: Hold on a second. 2 3 (Pause) 4 MR. BRAFMAN: I agree, your Honor. 5 MR. DINH: This is exactly -- the operative question 6 is obviously question number 9, which presents the 7 probabilities of the limitation on our representation. Question number 10 provides elucidation of those 8 9 specific factual scenarios. And as our submission last night 10 indicated, Professor Gillers recommended, and we propose to the 11 Court, the addition of questions 10(e) and 10(f), and I think 12 that if the Court accepts that, that encapsulates and 13 operationalizes the limitations that Professor Gillers had 14 reviewed and we would accept. 15 THE COURT: E and F? MR. DINH: E and F as an addition, yes, your Honor, 16 17 because A, B, C and D already takes care of all of the 18 possibilities that Mr. Lockard deals with, and then E and F goes one step further in terms of us not even participating 19 20 outwardly but --21 THE COURT: Do you agree? 22 MR. BRAFMAN: I agree that those are the pertinent 23 questions. 24 THE COURT: And Mr. Lockard? 25 MR. LOCKARD: Your Honor, I don't think we get to

question 10 because we still have two of the bank victims who have not waived the conflict. So I understand that it is

Mr. Dinh's position that the firm has voluntarily cabined its representation to the point where it is no longer adverse to those two particular victims, but I don't know the answer. I don't know if that is allowable under the rules or if the broad outlines of the representation creating those issues puts the clients in a position where even in the face of the proposed voluntary conditions their waiver is still required.

THE COURT: And what is your view with respect to Citibank, which has said that it will not sign a waiver?

MR. LOCKARD: If the Court determines that Citibank's waiver is required, then it seems to us that is the end of the inquiry at that point. Then that sort of feeds back into the question of --

THE COURT: But didn't you take the position before that there do need to be waivers on both sides, and does that mean all or none? In the case of Citibank, no waiver, no waiver of conflict is possible?

MR. LOCKARD: Without having had an opportunity to really research this question, it certainly appears from the face of the rule that Citibank is an affected client. It could be the law that the firm can make them unaffected by imposing, you know, self-imposed conditions on its representation of the other client. It's not obvious to me that that's true.

1 MR. DINH: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion in the interest of administration, your Honor? 2 3 THE COURT: OK. Yes. 4 MR. DINH: We have the issues all joined because 5 Citibank has advised that they will not waive. 6 THE COURT: Right. 7 MR. DINH: We have what I believe, and I don't hear 8 any difference, a complete set of <u>Curcio</u> questions. I think 9 that the government --10 THE COURT: And we are -- you are still pursuing the 11 two waivers that are out? 12 MR. DINH: We are. 13 THE COURT: And they haven't rejected --14 MR. DINH: Exactly. We are still -- the city has rejected but the Wells Fargo has not. We are still talking 15 with them. 16 17 The question that Mr. Lockard reserves as an anterior 18 question is really whether or not the sentence that I read to 19 the Court at the beginning in Professor Gillers' opinion is 20 indeed the law and whether or not --21 THE COURT: That's what I was just going to ask. 22 MR. DINH: Exactly. Whether or not the bank waivers 23 are relevant. Professor Gillers' opinion, our position is they 24 are not because there is nothing to waive.

What I suggest, what I propose, that we proceed with

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the <u>Curcio</u> portion of this and reserve for your Honor's decision — and perhaps Mr. Lockard would suggest additional briefing is required — that legal question whether or not it is adequate. At least then we could have a full record as to Mr. Zarrab's waiver in light — but still reserve in light of the Citibank nonwaiver and then reserve the question of law that Mr. Lockard wants further research on that seems to divide the parties.

MR. LOCKARD: I think there are still two at least open factual issues. One is the Wells Fargo, who has been requested to waive, we understand, but has not yet. It could be that Wells Fargo also declines to waive. It could be that they agree to waive but impose additional conditions that would be new facts the Court would have to consider and new facts for Mr. Zarrab to have to consider. So we think that that is an issue that in the interest of efficiency probably should be resolved first.

We think there is also an open factual question -
THE COURT: You think that Mr. Zarrab ought to know
whether or not there is going to be a Wells Fargo waiver and,
if there is, what it says before he can respond to these
questions?

MR. LOCKARD: I think so. You can imagine -- it seems unlikely, but Wells Fargo could say that we waive -- we want to sit in on defense strategy meetings. I don't think they would

do that but we don't know until we have the waiver.

THE COURT: I understand.

Was there something else?

MR. LOCKARD: There was another one and this loops back to an issue that was raised at the prior conference. So there had been a discussion about the process by which the waivers had been obtained. We alerted the Court to the fact that with respect to these banks the government has been in contact with certain portions of the bank for purposes of obtaining documents relating to the investigation and trial preparation, identifying trial witnesses, and beginning to prepare topics of trial testimony and trial testimony. Those individuals as of November 30th appear not to have had any substantive discussions with the portions of the bank counsel who had been considering the requests to waive the conflict.

So since then, the same two waivers that had already been issued before that discussion on the record on November 30th had been resubmitted to the Court. I don't know, maybe Mr. Dinh can answer the question, whether the bank internal conversations have now taken place and the banks' counsel reaffirms the waivers after having had that substantive discussion. I think the Court's concern had been that if the people considering the waiver were not in touch with the people actually affected by participating in the investigation and preparing for trial testimony, if they weren't talking to each

other the waivers could be illusory because the banks may not be fully informed about the scope of the factual or legal issues presented.

MR. DINH: I appreciate Mr. Lockard's--

MR. LOCKARD: I am not quite finished. I have just a little bit more to lay out so that Mr. Dinh can maybe address all of these issues at once.

Following the conference, we provided contact information to defense counsel for the individuals with whom we had been in touch. We provided those individuals with copies of the public filings relating to the <u>Curcio</u> issue and the transcript of the November 30th conference in an effort to try and fulfill the Court's desire that the banks have internal discussions to make the waivers effective and valid. We do not know if those people spoke to the individuals who considered the waivers and signed the waivers.

We asked defense counsel to provide us with the names of the individuals with whom they were speaking so that we could provide that contact information to the individuals at the bank that we had been in touch with, but we were not provided that information until after the waivers were signed and filed. We did see that the waivers were then provided to the individuals we had identified but it did not appear —

THE COURT: Say that again.

MR. LOCKARD: Defense counsel then provided the

individuals at the banks with whom the government had been communicating with copies of the executed waivers, but it wasn't apparent that the discussions between the two groups of people at the banks had occurred before the waivers were signed. And maybe Mr. Dinh is in a position to represent to the Court whether those discussions did or did not happen, but we think that that is an open factual issue that the Court already has expressed a deep interest in and should be resolved.

MR. DINH: I think the operative question here is whether or not those waivers are illusory, and we have taken steps and procedures in order to ensure that every part of the left hand knows what the right hand is doing. We copied Mr. Lockard on those transmittal emails. No bank has expressed anything other than thank you to us for providing that information.

THE COURT: So you are representing to the Court that the waivers speak for the bank?

MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: For the entire bank?

MR. DINH: Because we have provided those executed waivers to the parts of the bank that Mr. Lockard has been in communication with, and we have received no contrary indication that there was want of authority or that there were further revisions to be had. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So the waivers are as if they were issued by the chairman of the bank, as it were, and binds the whole bank?

MR. DINH: That is correct.

THE COURT: Whether somebody had spoken to somebody else as a factual matter, the entire bank is bound by those waivers?

MR. DINH: That is our understanding, especially given your Honor's instruction to ensure the identified individuals and the lines of authority within the bank, and we have taken all the steps necessary to inform the other parts of the bank that Mr. Lockard refers to, and there has been no contrary indication. Yes, your Honor.

MR. LOCKARD: Your Honor, I don't think that answers the question. I don't think there has ever been any dispute that the bank counsel executing the waivers had the authority to do so.

I think the concern that the Court expressed quite pointedly was that if parts of the bank have material information about the investigation or about the case that are not being communicated to the decision makers, it undermines the Court's confidence in those waivers. Waivers are revocable. If banks become aware of information that they wish they had known later on, this issue could come back up again later on in the proceedings. And so saying that the signed

waivers were presented to the knowledgeable part of the bank after they had been executed I don't think addresses the Court's concern at all.

MR. DINH: I think the concession that the question is not one of legal authority to bind the bank answers your Honor's question. There was additional concern that they are somehow illusory, but those concerns are adequately addressed by the full and frank apprisal of those waivers and decisions to the relevant parts of the bank. And I think that no further intrusion into the bank's deliberative processes or our attorney-client relationship with the bank is necessary in order to ensure the defendant's rights in this case.

THE COURT: And when did you anticipate that you will hear from -- Wells Fargo then is the only outstanding --

MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor, Wells Fargo is the only outstanding waiver that is out there.

THE COURT: And one way or another, you would know when, whether it is forthcoming or --

MR. DINH: Yeah. We were hoping to get it done before today, but we anticipate probably within the next 48 hours is my guess, probably. Again, I am not in charge of the timing and I can't push a string, but we are working as diligently as possible to provide the Court with the information.

THE COURT: OK. All right.

Anybody else?

(Pause)

So we will take a short break of about five or ten minutes.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

So here's what I'd like to do. In the interest of perhaps consistency, I do want to hold off asking the <u>Curcio</u> questions until we get the Wells Fargo response. I am happy to call you back whenever that comes in. If it comes in in a day or so, I can do it Tuesday morning at 10, if that is agreeable to all of you, or if it doesn't come by then, I will do it as soon as it comes in. It seems to me that if we're developing a record, we might as well have the full record, even though there is this just one item outstanding.

And even though we can assume, I suppose, or you are assuming that the answers to the questions that have been presented to the Court probably would not change one way or another if that bank decided not to waive or it had some different conditions, but, nevertheless, it doesn't make sense to not have a full record. Let's have a full record.

But in the meantime, I would like you to prepare, both the government and the defense, for simultaneous submission of findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to -- with authorities -- with respect to this <u>Curcio</u> issue. And as to that, I'm going to go off the record and you can talk among

yourselves as to what's a reasonable period of time that you would like to have to make those submissions. I will be at your disposal.

I think that they can be simultaneous submissions. I think each side knows everything that everybody else knows.

And so you tell me what are good dates for you for that so we don't hold up the process.

And with those findings of fact and conclusions of law, if you would submit a proposed form of judgment also, a short form, that you propose that the Court sign that covers your position.

MR. DINH: Your Honor, we would propose one week from today.

THE COURT: That is fine.

Is that OK with you?

MR. LOCKARD: I think that's fine. One potential wrinkle is if we don't get the last waiver of the bank's position until --

THE COURT: Well, that is understood. I think that is understood. I say that's fine. Let me just take a look.

(Pause)

All right. So let's tentatively set 12/20 at 10. That presumes that the Wells Fargo issue is in hand for the Q&A part of <u>Curcio</u>.

Is that all right with -- Mr. Brafman, is that OK with

you? The 20th at 10 works? 1 2 MR. BRAFMAN: I'm sorry? 3 THE COURT: The 20th at 10 works for you? 4 MR. BRAFMAN: Give me one second, sir. 5 THE COURT: OK. 6 (Pause) 7 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor. 8 MR. DINH: Yes, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: OK. And so could the government -- then 10 we'll say 12/21 for the submission of the findings of fact, conclusions of law. I'm interested in all of the issues that 11 12 we have been discussing, but in your findings of fact, 13 conclusions of law, I am most interested in the question that's 14 discussed in Professor Gillers' opinion, that no waivers are needed on the bank side at all, and I'm also interested in what 15 you all believe is the impact of the HSBC matter to this <u>Curcio</u> 16 17 proceeding. MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, is the 20th at 10 subject to 18 us having the information from the bank? 19 20 THE COURT: Yes. And if you don't, you will let me 21 know and I will make it at another time. 22 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. We will be 23 in touch with the Court. 24 THE COURT: So I will grant the applications of

Ms. Chung and Mr. Kleinfeld to exit the case, with our thanks

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for your participation, and Mr. Ferrari of entering into the Thanks to you as well. case. MR. FERRARI: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Any other issues that we need to address? MR. RIMM: Would your Honor like me here next Tuesday? THE COURT: Yes. Absolutely. For whenever we do the Q&A, I think having you here would be very desirable. OK? Anything else? MR. LOCKARD: Not from the government. THE COURT: Nope? Thanks very much.